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Pole Pole1: Hastening Justice at UNICTR
Eric Husketh*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

The United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, or the
Tribunal) was established in 1994 to deal with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity committed during that year in Rwanda (or by Rwandan nationals elsewhere),
primarily within a 100-day period from April to June. Even at its inception, the Tribunal
was viewed by many, not least of all the Rwandans themselves, as an extremely late,
patchwork means of dealing with Rwanda’s crisis.2 The International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia had been established in 1993,3 some two years after atrocities commenced
in that country, and Rwanda’s post-genocide Prime Minister called the Security Council
to task for their failure to take advantage of that precedent and deal with Rwanda in a
similar fashion, asking “[i]s it because we’re Africans that a court has not been set up?”4
Now, nearly ten years later, both Rwanda and the larger international community remain
deeply frustrated by the exceptionally slow pace of adjudications in Arusha.5 The
Tribunal’s present (third) mandate will expire in 2008, and although the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) and the Tribunal as a whole have developed exit strategies aimed at
completion by that time, there is great concern that ICTR will not be able to complete its
work, even if the mandate were renewed once again. This possibility raises grave
questions of social and political importance for Rwanda, but also practical issues such as
how to deal with any detainees whose cases are not completed by that time.6 This article
*

Eric Moss Husketh, J.D. Candidate 2005, Northwestern University School of Law; M.A. in International
Relations (2002), University of Chicago; B.A. in Psychology (1998), Duke University. I would like to
express my gratitude and admiration to the staff of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, and my true hope for the people of Rwanda that in some minute way my work here will contribute
to a brighter future. I am also thankful to my colleagues in the human rights community at Northwestern
Law for their hard work and guidance. I welcome comments at e-husketh2005@law.northwestern.edu.
1
A Swahili phrase used in Arusha, the seat of the Tribunal, meaning “slowly, slowly”—“be patient,” or
“don’t try to go too fast.”
2
See, e.g., Nsongurua Ndombana, Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union Treaty and
Human Rights, 17 A M. U. INT ’L. L. REV. 1177, 1223-24. See generally Barbara Crossette, Rwanda Asks
Quick Start Of Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, October 9, 1994.
3
UNSC Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 called for the establishment of a Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and instructed the Secretary General to prepare a report within 60 days regarding, inter
alia, the legal basis for establishing such a court. See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993). Most of the report’s suggestions then became part
of the ICTY statute, adopted by the Security Council as Resolution 827, (U.N. Doc S/RES/827) 25 May
1993 then became part of the ICTY statute, adopted by the Security Council as Resolution 827, (U.N. Doc
S/RES/827 (1993)) 25 May 1993.
4
1 VIRGINIA M ORRIS & M ICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA xvxvi (1998), quoting Nelson Graves, Premier Designate Compares Rwanda to Nazi Genocide, Reuters
World Service, 26 May 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
5
The Tribunal was placed in Arusha, and its Statute promulgated, by U.N. SCOR, Res. 955, 3452rd mtg,
U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (1994).
6
One option would be the transference of cases to Rwanda’s domestic courts, but an agreement would have
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will not focus on whatever institutional, political, or other reasons may have explained
the original inertia of the international community in dealing with Rwanda’s genocide.
These topics have been widely examined in multiple fora. Instead, I examine the final
push towards improving the Tribunal’s output and completing its mandate within the time
allotted.
As a legal intern at ICTR during the summer of 2003, this author was intrigued by
two major moves ostensibly aimed at expediting the tribunal’s work and enhancing the
quality of its output. The first of these was the addition of eighteen ad litem judges who
could be temporarily teamed with permanent judges, effectively dividing each of the
ICTR’s three trial chambers into two functional subunits and enabling the tribunal to hear
more cases. The second was the decision of the UN Security Council not to renew the
mandate of Prosecutor Carla del Ponte for the Rwanda Tribunal. While del Ponte would
continue as the Prosecutor for Yugoslavia, the mandate of her office was split and a new
Prosecutor, Hassan Bubacar Jallow of the Gambia, appointed for Rwanda. A significant
question in dealing with the decision to split the Prosecutor’s mandate is the motivation
for doing so. Appointing a Prosecutor to focus solely on Rwanda seems pragmatic in that
it will most likely expedite the Tribunal’s work, but inasmuch as it was a decision taken
by the UN Security Council, this decision must have also had its political elements. One
goal of this article is to examine the possibility that the decision to replace Carla del
Ponte at the ICTR was at least partially motivated by the Rwandan government’s animus
against her as well as its desire to preempt her continued investigation into war crimes
committed by the RPF/RPA during the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction.
The article will proceed by describing the halting pace of adjudication at the ICTR
and the problems caused by the delay, then by examining structural issues of the Tribunal
that contributed to these delays. Where possible, this article examines some steps that
have already been taken towards rectifying these problems and expediting the Tribunal’s
work. Next, the article examines the measures taken in mid-2003: how the changes came
to pass and how they may alleviate the problem. The article concludes by discussing the
potential of these measures to help expedite trials, and on a larger scale to advance peace
and reconciliation in Rwanda. Whenever possible, the article will draw on the author’s
personal experience as a legal intern at the ICTR in the summer of 2003.
II. DESCRIBING THE DELAYS

¶4

A cursory look at the judicial output of the ICTR provides a simplistic but useful
indicator of the Tribunal’s slowness. The current state of adjudications was described in a
letter from the President of the Tribunal, Judge Erik Møse of Norway, to the Security
Council dated 29 September 2003, describing the Tribunal’s most recent “Completion
Strategy.” As of President Møse’s 29 writing, the cases of twenty one accused had either
been completed or were waiting for judgments to be delivered.7 Using the more
to be concluded to protect the accused from the application of Rwanda’s death penalty, since the UN is
institutionally opposed and since the ICTR can not impose such a penalty. See id., Art. 23 para. 1.
7
Letter dated 3 October 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/946 (2003), 3 October 2003 [hereinafter Letter to Security Council]. The letter
transmits to the Security Council a letter from President Møse, including the Completion Strategy to show
that under the current rules allowing the use of four ad litem judges, the ICTR would not be able to
complete all the cases it anticipated the Prosecutor would bring. Judge Møse was writing to ask the
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conservative estimate of 800,000 deaths during the hundred-day genocide in 1994, this
represents less than one case completed per 38,000 deaths, and an average of just over
two cases per year of the tribunal’s existence. While the former figure may appear
sensationalistic, and is admittedly no indicator of legal efficiency, it is mentioned it here
to emphasize that the legal work of the tribunal carries a massive burden of human
suffering. The resulting emotional charge should not be overlooked because it can play a
substantial role in relationship between the Tribunal and its namesake country—that is,
the Tribunal can not and does not operate in a vacuum.
Between the commencement of trials in January 1997 and September 2003, the
ICTR had handed down eleven judgments (for thirteen accused). One of these accused,
Ignace Bagilishema was the Tribunal’s only acquittal up to the time of President Møse’s
writing,8 and three more were guilty pleas9 . Of these completed cases, six of the
convicted had begun their prison sentences in Mali. Three cases for four accused were on
appeal. 10
While the raw numbers of completed cases suggest a bleak outlook for the
Tribunal, the rate of completion has nearly doubled in the Tribunal’s second mandate
(1999-2003) as compared to its first mandate (1994-1999). In September 2003, four cases
were in progress with twelve accused, and the two “Government” group trials with eight
accused were scheduled to begin on November 3, 2003. Thus in November 2003, the
Tribunal would be trying nearly as many accused (twenty) as it had tried in the past nine
years combined (twenty-one). In a conference with ICTR legal interns organized by this
author in June, 2003, Judge Møse addressed the fact that the first years of the Tribunal’s
work had produced a very low number of final judgments, but defended these less
efficient years as a necessary period of foundation-laying. The recent upswing in the
Tribunal’s activity may signal that certain initial problems have been solved, and that
efficiency may continue to improve through the end of the Tribunal’s third mandate. This
is a possibility to be considered throughout this paper, as many of the problems described
herein appear to have been “growing pains” of sorts.

Security Council to approve the use of nine judges, as it had done with ICTY, in order to further expedite
proceedings.
8
Two more defendants have been acquitted since the initial writing of this article. These were Emmanuel
Bagambiki and Andre Ntagerura in the “Cyangugu” case, THE PROSECUTOR v. EMMANUEL
BAGAMBIKI and SAMUEL IMANISHIMWE and THE PROSECUTOR v. ANDRÉ NTAGERURA,
Case No. ICTR-99-46-T . See Hirondelle News Agency, ICTR/CALENDAR - 2004: A YEAR OF BOTH
CONTROVERSIES AND PROGRESS FOR ICTR, 1/04/2005 available at
http://www.hirondelle.org/arusha.nsf/LookupUrlEnglish/E16F1E358FC6B95443256F7F00234C04?OpenD
ocument (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
9
Letter to Security Council, supra note 7.The accused who pled guilty were Ruggiu, Kambanda, and
Serushago
10
Id. It must be noted that immediately before this article was submitted for publication, two additional
accused were acquitted and approved for provisional release while appeals were pending. See ICTR Press
Release, Trial Chamber Convicts Imanishmwe but Acquits Ntagerura and Bagambiki, February. 25, 2004,
at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2004/376.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005), and ICTR Press
Release, Tribunal Grants Conditional Release of Ntagerura and Bagambiki, February 27, 2004, at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2004/377.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
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III. THE PROSECUTOR V. BARAYAGWIZA : DELAY PAR EXCELLENCE
¶7

¶8

Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the ICTR’s inability to speedily complete
trials has been the Barayagwiza case. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a former official in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was accused of genocide, complicity in genocide, and crimes
against humanity.11 He had been a leader of the Coalition for the Defense of the
Republic, an anti-Tutsi party that actively participated in the 1994 massacres, and a
founder of Radio Television Libres des Mille Collines, the broadcast mouthpiece of
Rwanda’s Hutu Power factions.12 Barayagwiza was arrested in Cameroon on March 27,
1996, and was not transferred to Arusha for nineteen months.13
Although Barayagwiza was first arrested at the request of Rwandan authorities,
Cameroon’s courts declined to extradite him to Rwanda. He was released in February,
1997 and then re-arrested at the request of the ICTR. He was transferred to the UN
Detention Facility (UNDF) in Arusha on November 19, 1997. Almost a year later, on
November 17, 1998, Trial Chamber II of the ICTR rejected Barayagwiza’s claim that the
continued delay had violated his right to a prompt and fair trial. 14 On appeal, however
(but yet another year later), the Appeals Chamber based in The Hague found that
Barayagwiza’s rights had indeed been violated and ordered his release.15 The newlyappointed Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, immediately appealed the decision based on “new
and additional facts”16 (that were criticized as neither)17 . Barayagwiza was held pending
the outcome of the Prosecutor’s appeal. According to Amnesty International, the
governments of both Rwanda and Belgium may have planned in the interim to request
Barayagwiza’s re-arrest and extradition by Tanzanian authorities for trial in one of their
national courts if he were eventually released.18

11

Barayagwiza’s case, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza (ICTR Case No. ICTR-97-19) was
merged into the “Media” group trial. For a summary of the merged “Media” trial, see The Prosecutor v.
Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze (ICTR Case No. ICTR-99-52-T),
Summary, December 3, 2003, at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/judgement/Summary%20of%20judgment-Media.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2005) (summarizing the court’s decision in advance of producing authoritative texts)
[hereinafter Media Summary].
12
Press Release, Amnesty International, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza Must Not Escape Justice, 24 November 1999. Available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/rwanda/document.do?id=0F523D1C335BAFF18025690000692E68
(last visited Apr. 4, 2005). Note that Georges Ruggiu, the only non-Rwandan (a Belgian) to be tried by the
ICTY, was a staff member of the radio station.
13
Christopher Wren, UN Tribunal Wrong to Free Top Suspect, Rwanda Says, N.Y. TIMES, November 12,
1999.
14
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, ICTR Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision on the Extremely
Urgent Motion by the Defence for Orders to Review and/or Nullify the Arrest and Provisional Detention of
the Suspect, 17 November 1998, at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/RELEASE1198.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2005). See also Amnesty International, supra note 12.
15
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v.The Prosecutor, [Appeals Chamber] Decision, 3 November 1999, at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
16
Maury D. Shenk et al, International Criminal Tribunals or the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 34
INT ’L LAW . 683, 689, (2000).
17
Maury D. Shenk et al, International Criminal Tribunals or the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 35
INT ’L LAW . 622, 630-31 (2001).
18
Id. See also Amnesty International, supra note 12.

Copyright 2005 Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights

¶9

Volume 3 (Spring 2005)

The decision of the Appeals Chamber represented an unabated disaster for the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), and demonstrates the political ramifications of the
ICTR’s work. At the time of the decision, Carla del Ponte had just begun her tenure as
the replacement for Louise Arbour, who had resigned her post as prosecutor in September
to accept an appointment to Canada’s high court.19 The Appeals Chamber, cognizant of
the gravity of the charges against Barayagwiza, issued a scathing condemnation of OTP’s
handling of the case: “it appears that the Prosecutor’s failure to prosecute this case was
tantamount to negligence.”20 The appeals chamber chastened OTP from both sides of the
issue, both for its apparent disregard for the rights of the accused, as well as for its
failure to prosecute such serious crimes. Moreover,
[N]othing less than the integrity of the Tribunal is at stake in this case.
Loss of public confidence in the Tribunal, as a court valuing the human
rights of all individuals—including those charged with unthinkable
crimes—would be among the most serious consequences of allowing the
Appellant to stand trial in the face of such violations of his rights.21

Barayagwiza was to be released “so that no further injustice results.”22 At the time
of the decision, several accused had been in custody for more than five years. 23 Within
one month of the appellate decision, Theoneste Bagosora and three other accused had
filed for release or indicated their intent to do so due to their own extensive
imprisonment.24
¶11
The government of Rwanda was incensed at the decision to release Barayagwiza,
who was viewed at home as the “number one criminal.”25 The government immediately
blasted OTP’s “prosecutorial incompetence”26 and suspended cooperation with the
Tribunal, making it virtually impossible for any other cases to move forward because
witnesses could not be transported from Rwanda to Arusha to testify. This was especially
damaging because several circumstances had already combined that year to keep the
¶10

19

Wren, supra note 13.
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor II, supra note 15, at Para. 106.
21
Id. at Para. 112.
22
Id.
23
Thierry Cruvellier, A Serious Crisis, DIPLOMATIE JUDICIAIRE , TPIRUK 12 at 1, available at
http://www.justicetribune.com/article_uk.php?id=2080. The reader should note that Diplomatie Judiciare
was a web-based information service that placed journalists in Arusha and is heavily cited in this article.
The service has ceased operations, but with few exceptions, Diplomatie Judiciare articles have been
archived in a new membership-based news service, International Justice Tribune
(http://www.justicetribune.com). For certain articles cited herein, the members of International Justice
Tribune have graciously provided links to the new archived locations of old Diplomatie Judiciare articles.
For others, the original Diplomatie Judiciare web addresses are cited to assist the reader in locating the
articles within the International Justice Tribune archives, if so desired.
24
Shenk , supra note 16. Bagosora is a former military commander, currently part of the “Military 1” group
trial, who is generally regarded as the mastermind of the genocide. His individual case was The Prosecutor
v. Theoneste Bagosora, ICTR Case No. ICTR-96-7; joinder with Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze, and
Anatole Nsengiyumva was granted by Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Joinder, 29 June, 2000,
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Kabiligi/decisions/290600.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
25
Wren, supra note 13.
26
Rwanda Bars U.N. Tribunal Prosecutor; Visa Refused after Court Freed Genocide Suspect, W ASH.
POST , November 23 1999.
20

Copyright 2005 Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights

Volume 3 (Spring 2005)

court from hearing a single case between July and October 1999.27 Rwanda also targeted
its wrath at Carla del Ponte personally; although the Tribunal sat in Arusha, del Ponte’s
own office and investigating staff remained in Kigali, and Rwanda refused to issue her a
visa to enter the country.28
¶12
The Prosecutor won her appeal some five months later, with the appeals chamber
finding that Barayagwiza’s rights had indeed been violated but not to the point that he
should be set free. Instead, if he were found guilty, his sentence should reflect proper
consideration of these violations.29 Shortly after the Appeals Chamber reinstated
Barayagwiza’s trial in March 2000, del Ponte was rewarded by Rwanda with a permanent
visa.31 The win was quite a coup for del Ponte in that she was able to kill two birds with
one stone; she had retained the chance to prosecute serious crimes, but she had also
allowed both her own OTP and the Rwandan government to save face.
¶13
The Barayagwiza appeal was crucial for del Ponte for several reasons. First, she
needed to establish her own legitimacy in the eyes of the Rwandan government and
virtually everyone else observing. Next, OTP had already poured its resources into
building a case against Barayagwiza, and because OTP actually selects the suspects it
will prosecute, letting Barayagwiza slip away would have been a waste of “sunk”
resources and an embarrassment. Finally, in a larger sense, del Ponte needed to rescue the
prosecution in order to preserve relations with Rwanda, who had made clear that it had
the power to shut down the ICTR at its whim. With Barayagwiza, it became clear that
politics and relations with the Rwandan government had already begun to taint the purity
of legal work going on at ICTR; del Ponte even publicly stated that if Barayagwiza’s trial
were not reinstated, the Tribunal should “put the key under the mat.”32 Had del Ponte not
eventually won her Barayagwiza appeal, the Tribunal process could have completely
disintegrated. 33
¶14
The Barayagwiza fiasco highlights the fact that the ICTR does not work in a
vacuum. The entire Tribunal has the uneasy mandate of applying international law in a
fair and disinterested fashion, yet it must depend upon and even participate in
27

See generally Note [Transmitting the 5 th annual report of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the
Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994, Covering the Period 1 July
1999-30 June 2000 para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/55/435, October 2, 2000 [hereinafter Fifth Annual Report].
28
Rwanda Bars UN Tribunal Prosecutor, supra note 26.
29
If Barayagwiza were instead found innocent, he was to receive financial compensation. Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, ICTR Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for
Review or Reconsideration), March 31, 2000, Para. 74, at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005). See
also Shenk, supra note 17.
30
Del Ponte made this statement in an interview in Kigali, December 7, 2001. International Crisis Group,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Delayed Justice 21 (2001) [hereinafter ICG Report].
31 Rwanda: Arusha court prosecutor dismisses possibility of transferring detainees, BBC, May 14, 2000.
32
Del Ponte made this statement in an interview in Kigali, December 7, 2001. International Crisis Group,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Delayed Justice 21 (2001), available at
http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=1649&l=1 (last visited Apr. 4, 2005)[hereinafter ICG Report].
33
All three accused in the Media case were found guilty of various crimes, including genocide, on
December 03, 2003. Barayagwiza’s co-accused were Hassan Ngeze (founder of the anti-Tutsi newspaper
Kangura), and Ferdinana Nahimana (Barayagwiza’s co-founder of RTLM). Ngeze and Nahimana were
sentenced to life in prison, but Barayagwiza’s sentence was reduced to twenty-seven years in light of the
prior violations of his rights. See Media Summary, supra note 11, and Sharon LaFraniere, Court Convicts
3 in 1994 Genocide Across Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, December 4, 2003.
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international politics to be able to accomplish that work. Perhaps reminded by
Barayagwiza of its precarious position and the need for good relations with Rwanda, the
ICTR made efforts throughout 2000 to reach out. For example, the Tribunal released to
the Rwandan government a CD-ROM containing the entire confession of Jean
Kambanda, the single highest-ranked government official at the time of the genocide.34
The Tribunal also established an information and outreach center in Kigali, and some
judges agreed to a “goodwill” visit to massacre sites within Rwanda for the first time. 35
After these palliative overtures, Rwanda’s representative to the ICTR stated that “many
things have been put right as far as the workings of the Tribunal and its relationship with
Rwanda.”36 In November of 2000, Carla del Ponte went so far as to suggest that relations
had improved enough to negotiate holding some ICTR trials in Rwanda in order to
deepen the Tribunal’s connection to Rwanda.37
¶15
It is important to note, however, that relations with Rwanda are not the ICTR’s
only political concern. The ICTR must maintain positive relationships with literally
dozens of countries where suspects, witnesses, or evidence may be found, or where
convicts may be sent to serve their prison terms, and most of all to secure funding at the
UN itself. 38
IV. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS DELAYING JUSTICE
¶16

While the Barayagwiza fiasco was a distinct disaster on the part of OTP, the
Tribunal as a whole has been plagued by a number of serious problems, all of which
continue to combine to cause the most obvious of the ICTR’s failures: the simple
inability to conclude trials quickly and efficiently. The web-based journal Diplomatie
Judiciare/Judicial Diplomacy, produced by journalists working close to the Tribunal in
and around Arusha, succinctly listed the ICTR’s seemingly eternal handicaps in 2000: “a
slow legal system, the lack of experience of a pioneering court, language difficulties,
administrative unwieldiness, judges’ holidays, a strategic power struggle, procrastinatory
manoeuvres, a lack of cooperation, power networks, etc.”39 This “explosive cocktail”40 of
problems seems virtually inevitable given the nature of the court, and has proved
34

The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR Case No. ICTR-97-23. Kambanda was the Prime Minister in
the Interim Government which presided over the genocide. See also ICG Report, supra note 32, at 21
35
Shenk supra note 17 at 627-28..
36
Id at FN 76, citing Coalition for International Justice, ICTR Judges to Visit Crime Scenes (August 16,
2000) at http://www.cij.org/content.html. Three judges had visited Rwanda for three days in November
1999 to view massacre sites at the request of defense counsel for Ignace Bagilishema—notably, as
mentioned earlier, the ICTR’s only acquittal until early 2004. See Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema,
Judgement, ICTR Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Para. 10, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Bagilishema/judgement/2.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
37
Id. at Footnote 77, Citing Prosecutor Seeks to Move ICTR Hearings on Genocide to Rwanda, Xinhua,
November 21, 2000 In May of the same year, del Ponte said the opposite, namely that Rwanda’s continuing
use of the death penalty made such transfers impossible.. See Rwanda: Arusha court Prosecutor dismisses
possibility of transferring detainees, supra note 31.
38
An expert report in 1999 examined the dependent nature of the ICTR’s political relationships at length.
See Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
U.N. Doc. A/54/634, 22 November 1999, para. 25 [hereinafter Expert Group Report].
39
Softly does it , DIPLOMATIE JUDICIAIRE 7 (2000), available at
http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/UK/Tpiruk/TPIRUK4.htm. See supra note 23.
40
Id.
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difficult, but not impossible, to overcome. This section examines some of the major
issues that continue to slow the process of adjudications in Arusha, and where possible,
progress in reducing these impediments.
A. Financial Issues
¶17

It can hardly be argued that the ICTR suffers from a lack of financial support.
Annual budgets for the Tribunal hover just above $100 million,41 only some $20 million
less than the ICTY. It would be facile, however, to assume that such a large budget
should automatically translate into speedy trials or that the two ad hoc Tribunals can
easily be compared against each other. Rather, it could be argued that the budget must
necessarily be so large precisely because running the Tribunal is so difficult in Arusha,
and that the circumstances surrounding the work of the ICTR are so different from those
of ICTY that a dollar-for-dollar comparison is of little use. I outline here some costs of
the ICTR to underscore that, while limited resources may indeed contribute to delay,
throwing money at Arusha may not automatically produce an increase in the ICTR’s
output or efficiency.
¶18
Several unique circumstances draining off the ICTR’s admittedly huge budget are
immediately noticeable to anyone working at the Tribunal. Firstly, technical services and
goods are substantially more difficult to come by than in the Hague, and most of the
resources now available to ICTR have been assembled from scratch. 42 For example, the
ICTR’s website was assembled at a pay-per-use Internet Café in Arusha.43 Before the
Arusha International Conference Center became the home of ICTR, it was just that—a
conference center. Preparations for the special needs of the Tribunal required massive
investments of time and money, such as installing generators to cope with inadequate
electricity supplies and converting conference rooms into acceptable trial chambers.44 As
the Tribunal continues to expand its various capacities, construction work must be carried
out (to UN standards) at the Arusha International Conference Center at prices inflated by
Arusha’s relative inaccessibility. Such infrastructure issues are vastly decreased at the
Hague by the ICTY’s ability to rely on existing resources (costs of European labor
notwithstanding).48 An Expert Group to review the ICTR’s performance emphasized the
dilatory effect of starting from scratch in a 1999 report, noting among other problems that
while the first indictment was issued in 1995, the first courtroom was not completed until

41 See generally Budget for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the
Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 for the biennium 2004-2005 ,
58th Session, Aug. 12, 2003, U.N. Doc.A/58/269.
42
See generally Judging Genocide, THE ECONOMIST , June 16, 2001 (US Edition).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
A Guide to the Mobility and Hardship Scheme, International Civil Service Commission, May 1997.
Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/allowances/mobility/mobility.doc.
46
Guide for ICTR Staff in Arusha, May 2002.Available at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm
47
Conditions of service of the professional and higher categories: linkage between the mobility and
hardship allowance and base/floor salary scale, Note by the secretariat of the International Civil Service
Commission, U.N. Doc. ICSC/57/R.5. Available at http://icsc.un.org/other/SES/57r5.doc.
48
Id.
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1996.49 The third courtroom was not completed until 1999. One high-ranking OTP
official in a confidential email opined that the lag time created by Arusha’s initial lack of
infrastructure was the single largest cause of delay.50
¶19
Another particular concern that delays work in Arusha has been the Tribunal’s
information technology capacity, in terms of intra- and internet access and the availability
of up-to-date and functional computing, which had been a handicap from the beginning.51
Other day-to-day tasks such as printing services may be available only at drastically
increased prices or at substantially reduced quality—this author became well acquainted
with prosecution staff planning their home leave around securing necessary goods for
their teams, such as maps of massacre sites large enough to be seen by both judges and
witnesses without moving around.52
¶20
Another major delay in Arusha has been the procurement of simultaneous
translation into English, French, and Kinyarwanda. While simultaneous translation
requires talented personnel to be present at all times, it also requires substantial
technology that was not put in place in all three trial chambers until 2003.53 At least three
soundproof translation rooms are needed for each chamber, with requisite microphones,
headphones, and other equipment. Until that time, it had been necessary to interpret
witness testimony from Kinyarwanda into French, and then from French into English.54
2003 also saw significant improvement in the quality of transcription and recording
services. Translation had been such a problem that in 2000 the judges authorized the use
of outside translators55 , after Hassan Ngeze, a defendant in the Media case, requested
translation of all 71 issues of the Kangura newspaper he had edited. Kangura had been a
major source of anti-Tutsi hate propaganda. The Chamber replied that the ICTR simply
did not have the resources to provide such a substantial translation, and as a result Hassan
Ngeze briefly boycotted his own trial56 Further, the lack of translation capabilities has
also held up the release of judicial decisions.57 Between the completion of simultaneous

49

Expert Group Report, supra note 38, para. 21.
Email on file with author.
51
Dire lack of computing resources in Kigali are noted in [Report of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services on the Audit and Investigation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda], U.N. Doc.
A/51/789, 6 February 1997 at para. 48 [hereinafter Paschke Report]. In this author’s observation, the
shortage appears to continue at present in Arusha. For example, eight interns working in one office in the
summer of 2003 shared two computers with internet access. See also Judging Genocide, supra note 42.
52
This was the case in the Military 1 trial during this author’s internship; it was simply impossible for the
trial team to produce a map of a massacre site large enough to be seen by the entire trial chamber.
53
Note [Eighth annual report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and OtherSerious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994] Covering
the period 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003 at 18, U.N. Doc. A/58/140, 11 July, 2003 [hereinafter Eighth
Annual Report].
54
Note [Transmitting the 6 th annual report of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Covering
the period 1 July 2000-30 June 2001] para. 40, U.N. Doc. A/56/351, September 14, 2001 [hereinafter Sixth
Annual Report].
55
Fifth Annual Report, supra note 27.
56
ICTR Press Release, Media Trial Opens, at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/245.htm
(last visited Apr. 4, 2005). See also Media Summary, supra note 11.
57
Sixth Annual Report, supra note 54, para. 48
50
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translation facilities and the improvements in court recording, Judge Møse has expressed
optimism that translation could now move at least 25% faster than previously.58
¶21
Finally, security at the Tribunal and the detention facility must be expanded in
Arusha to protect certain members of the staff as they travel to and from work. This
means that ICTR’s security staff sometimes functions as a de facto police force around
Arusha as violent crime in the town continues to increase.59 Arusha serves as a gateway
for tourists headed to the Serengeti and Mt. Kilimanjaro, most often via Nairobi or Dar es
Salaam. As the only major city in this region of Tanzania, Arusha also receives steady
flows of the rural poor in search of work. Cheating or robbing tourists is easy as they are
instantly recognizable; robbing ICTR staff is even easier as they are often the only
foreigners dressing formally and are highly visible in traffic with their diplomatic license
plates (and, of course, cars that virtually no one in Arusha can afford). Safety in Arusha
thus presents one more practical problem for OTP and other ICTR staff : putting in late
hours in the interest of efficiency at the ICTR can be a risky proposition because of the
dangers of driving home or taking a taxi after dark. Door-to-door shuttle service is
provided for staff who do not drive, but shuttles leave promptly after the end of the
official work day.60 Thus burning the midnight oil as is the norm in most legal cultures is
simply not an easy option.
¶22
With regard to living and working in Arusha, it is also worth mentioning that
internationally recruited staff members who are contracted for more than one year must
also have their salaries adjusted upwards for the hardship posting. 61 Arusha and Kigali
have been classified as a “C” hardship station on a scale of A to E. 62 For reference,
Kabul, Afghanistan is an E, and Freetown, the seat of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
has recently been upgraded from E to D.63 While this may not account for a substantial
portion of the ICTR’s expenditures, it nonetheless adds to the cost of running the
Tribunal in Arusha. While it has not been verified, the fact that Arusha is a hardship post
may also make it more difficult to hire and retain the talented personnel necessary for an
efficient court.
B. Cost and the division of offices
¶23

Another structural concern is the bifurcation of the ICTR’s offices in Kigali and
Arusha. Clearly the cost of maintaining two facilities, when combined with the cost of
transporting personnel and materials between the two, presents a serious challenge for the
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Eighth Annual Report, supra note 53.
For a first-hand assessment of security in Arusha, see Security Awareness, ICTR Newsletter Vol. 1, No.
3, August 2003 available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/newsletter/aug03/aug03.doc (last visited Apr. 4,
2005). See also Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the follow-up to the 1997 audit and
investigation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/52/784, 6 February 1998, at
paras 63-68 [hereinafter Follow-Up Report].
60
Author’s personal observation during internship.
61
A Guide to the Mobility and Hardship Scheme, International Civil Service Commission, May 1997,
available at http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/ppd/mhardship/MOBILITYENG.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,
2005).
62
Guide for ICTR Staff in Arusha, May 2002, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/opportunities/guide/index.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
63
Consolidated List of Entitlements, Effective 1 January 2005, International Civil Service Commission, at
http://icsc.un.org/resources/html/ppd/hardship/hs/hs_frm.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005)
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Tribunal. 64 However, the additional cost alone is not the only challenge presented by the
separation of functions. Communication and coordination between the two offices, even
with telephone and intranet links, is necessarily hampered by the lack of face-to-face
interaction and the inability to simply have a group meeting between, for example,
prosecutors and the investigators on whom they rely to produce evidence and reliable
witnesses. In the early years when OTP was entirely based in Kigali and the Registry in
Arusha, the distance appears to have hampered good relations between those offices as
well.65
¶24
In addition, the need for OTP staff (now mostly stationed in Arusha) to be
physically present in Rwanda from time to time should not be underestimated. Especially
as witnesses’ memories fade these ten years after the genocide, the ability of OTP staff to
fully understand, for example, the physical layout of massacre sites or other localities can
be crucial to developing a case. Thus the physical distance between the Tribunal and the
area with which it deals must necessarily increase the amount of time, effort, and money
needed to mount a prosecution. The ICTR maintains a single seven-passenger aircraft
which usually makes two trips per week between Arusha and Kigali, and Tribunal staff
must balance their need for travel with budget constraints as well as witness protection
issues: if witnesses are being transported to or from Arusha on the aircraft, other staff
may be barred from the flight to protect the witness’ anonymity and/or to avoid
“contaminating” the witness. The ICTR and ICTY are conceivably the only courts in the
world with the unique logistical burden of having to regularly fly their staff and witnesses
back and forth across national borders to accomplish their work, and it is probably even
more rare that the country concerned occasionally is hostile to such exchanges.
¶25
While the dilatory effect of maintaining two offices is obvious to all concerned, this
is seemingly an inevitable problem. At the time Security Council Resolution 955 was
passed establishing the Tribunal, Kigali was essentially a disaster area. Questions of
security and the availability of resources would have been even more serious had the
ICTR been established in Kigali because it is even less accessible than Arusha.
Furthermore, if a (hypothetical) ICTR in Kigali were to focus on “bigger fish” as it has
had to do in Arusha, a situation similar to the present one would have arisen: while the
ICTR focused its limited, but nevertheless substantial, resources on providing due
process for high-level defendants who could only be sentenced to life imprisonment, the
decimated Rwandan judicial system would have to apply its vastly reduced resources to
the remaining massive numbers of individual criminals, who could be sentenced to death
for crimes that are presumably lesser in magnitude67 . The duality between the fairness of
trials at the ICTR and those in Rwanda is already disturbing,68 as is the fact that the
64

See generally Paschke Report, supra note 51, para 41.
Id. Para. 42.
66
See Julia Preston, Tribunal set on war crimes, Kigali votes no on UN resolution, Washington Post, Nov. 9
1994. Of course, the Security Council’s refusal to apply the death penalty was one of the reasons Rwanda
was the only “no” vote on Resolution 955, despite its professed support for the Tribunal.
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See Julia Preston, Tribunal Set On Rwanda War Crimes; Kigali Votes No On U.N. Resolution, W ASH.
POST , November 9, 1994. Of course, the Security Council’s refusal to apply the death penalty was one of
the reasons Rwanda was the only “no” vote on Resolution 955, despite its professed support for the
Tribunal.
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See, e.g., Amnesty International, Rwanda: the troubled course of justice, April 25, 2000, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/rwanda/document.do?id=00B458F4B18051F2802568BF004A5937
(last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
65

Copyright 2005 Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights

Volume 3 (Spring 2005)

planners of the genocide are immune from the death penalty while those who carried out
their plans are not. Placing the Tribunal in Kigali would have made this dichotomy even
more apparent, and even more likely to hamper reconciliation and reconstruction.
¶26
As mentioned above, Carla del Ponte appears to have toyed with the idea of
moving some elements of the trial process into Rwanda to help increase the relevance of
the Tribunal’s work to the Rwandan people. This would have seemed possible as Kigali
settled down in the years after the conflict, but the idea does not seem to have gotten
anywhere because the continuing death penalty and fair trial dichotomies have never been
resolved.69 Furthermore, it is well known that, having ruled out Kigali and being
“uninvited” from Nairobi, the UN had virtually no other options for placing the ICTR
near Rwanda except Arusha. Ten years later, after pouring so much money and time into
developing the necessary infrastructure in Arusha, shifting back to Kigali would seem
wasteful. While most of the activities formerly carried out in Kigali have been
consolidated to Arusha, including the posting of a Deputy Prosecutor to manage OTP
while the Prosecutor was in the Hague or elsewhere, it will be necessary to maintain
some kind of presence in Kigali for two reasons. First, as long as prosecutions are
ongoing, OTP in Arusha will require the capacity to simply call Kigali and ask for
whatever evidence it may need. Further, it is politically necessary to maintain a physical
presence in Kigali. This is not only necessary to connect the ICTR’s work to the people
of Rwanda, but also to avoid the possibility that the ICTR could be completely shut out
of Rwanda if another fiasco like Barayagwiza were to again sour relations with the
Rwandan government. That is, if no ICTR staff are present in Kigali, it would be far
easier for a disgruntled Rwandan government to bar ICTR staff from entering altogether.
Thus the dilatory effect of maintaining two offices must continue to be tolerated.
¶27
While this article has examined the cost (in terms of time, money, and general
efficiency) of maintaining offices in Kigali and Arusha, the vastly increased distance
between the Hague, where the Prosecutor and the Appeals Chamber for both tribunals are
based, is perhaps the most salient handicap. This article will return to this issue by way of
discussing the decision to dismiss Carla del Ponte from her post for Rwanda.
¶28
The foregoing are primarily practical issues that have hampered the efficiency of
OTP and the ICTR at large. However, it must be noted that corruption and
mismanagement have also cost the Tribunal money and slowed it down. Audits have
revealed incompetence and misconduct within the Tribunal’s administration, as well as
lacunae in the pay procedures for defense counsel that had allowed defense lawyers to
share the fees they received with the accused and their families. Problems with court
management and with defense counsel have seriously affected both the speed and the cost
of carrying out trials, and so I will discuss them in turn.
C. Management
¶29

The incompetence and/or misconduct of ICTR staff, particularly those in
administrative positions, was an early source of concern for the Tribunal. Procurement,
hiring, management of defense counsel, and other administrative matters are within the
mandate of the Registrar (at the time of writing, Adama Dieng of Senegal), as is the dayto-day coordination of transit, language and documentation services, scheduling, and
69
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other services upon which the court’s progress depends.70 Given the practical challenges
of working in Arusha as described above, the efficient integration of all these crucial
services demands talented and dedicated personnel. The UN’s auditing branch, the Office
for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), issued a report on the state of affairs at the ICTR
in February of 1997.71 The report, commonly known as the Paschke report for the head of
OIOS, found “faulty accounting processes, hiring of unqualified applicants, widespread
disregard of U.N. regulations… [and] neglect of the problems by U.N. officials in New
York.”72 The Paschke report also cited “a finance director who had no degree in
finance…and a procurement chief who had no experience in U.N. procurement
procedures.”73 A wave of firings followed, including the Registrar himself, Andronico
Adeye (Kenya) who “spent half of his time on duty traveling in the region on official
business” 74 and Deputy Prosecutor Honore Rakotomanana (Madagascar) who had
clashed notoriously with his superiors Richard Goldstone and Louise Arbour.75
¶30
Regardless of the quality of personnel, the ICTR was handicapped from the start
by a statute, written as it was by UN bureaucrats, that placed budgeting and
administration under the full command of the Registry, rather than subject to the needs of
the court as seen by the judges.76 The Rules of Procedure as adopted by the Chambers
provided for some judicial oversight of administration, but this provision was explicitly
rejected by Registrar Andronico Adeye who insisted that the Rules were subordinate to
the Statute and therefore powerless over him. Adeye thus felt that he was entitled to
override administrative actions taken by other ICTR bodies. This controversy remained
even after Adeye’s dismissal, most famously causing serious tensions between President
Navi Pillay (South Africa) and Adeye’s replacement, Agwu Okali (Nigeria).77 Okali in
turn was dismissed by the Secretary General in 2001.78 Tensions between the Registry
and the Chambers have also been illustrated (and worsened) by statements from Judges
Aspegren and Ostrovksy publicly denouncing the Registry’s incompetence79 . While
wrangling over administrative decision-making clearly damaged the court’s efficiency, it
must also be noted that the ongoing problem absolved the Chambers and the OTP of their
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For a basic outline of the duties of the Registrar, see Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Art. 16, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited Apr. 4,
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1997.
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For a discussion of the resulting controversy over certain management issues, see Expert Group Report,
supra note 38 at paras. 237-247.
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See ICG report, supra note 32 at 12.
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own responsibility to keep things running smoothly, as whatever problems arose could all
too easily be blamed on the Registry.80
D. Issues with Defense Counsel
¶31

Early in the Tribunal’s existence, large numbers of motions were necessary to flesh
out the law being applied because the participating lawyers came from diverse legal
systems, and because the ICTR is a sort of synthetic and novel civil-common law hybrid
with little precedent on which to rely for guidance. Thus as with practical infrastructure
matters, it should be expected that the number of motions and their dilatory effect on the
ICTR should taper off as the bulk of novel questions are answered. However, defense
counsel are continuously accused of slowing down the court by continued excessive use
of motions. By no means should this submission be taken to broadly insinuate
misconduct or abuse of the court by defense counsel, but it seems clear that the excessive
use of motions by defense is a problem. Part of the problem arises from the way defense
is provided—thus far, every accused has been deemed indigent and provided counsel free
of charge.81 In 1999, the ICTR spent $4.5 million on defending accused, with that figure
expected to rise.82 At that time, the most experienced lawyers earned $110 per hour for a
potential salary of $230,000 per year, and the registry had no way of verifying the
veracity of the number of hours billed.83 Thus a defense attorney has substantial incentive
to stretch out trials for his or her own financial gain (and perhaps the prestige of the
position), but because of the relative ease with which an accused can dismiss his or her
defense84 , it also becomes necessary to make a show of “earning one’s keep.” That is,
defense counsel must make it obvious that he or she is actively pursuing the accused’s
case in court by, among other tactics, making numerous motions of potentially dubious
merit to impress the accused.85 Delay of this kind is not solely the fault of defense
counsel, however, as it is also the responsibility of judges to manage their courtrooms and
keep the proceedings moving. Judge Ostrovsky, for example, is one of several judges
criticized for failing to reign in defense counsel in the interest of efficiency.86 In order to
more effectively manage defense counsel, the judges decided in 2002 to begin ordering
the Registry to withhold payment for services rendered in the filing of frivolous defense
motions. They also decided to allow single judges to decide motions rather than the entire
80

See generally ICG Report, supra note 32 at 12.
U.N.S.C. Res. 955, supra note 5, Art.20 §4(d).
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ICG report, supra note 32.
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accused to change counsel are addressed in the Expert Group Report, supra note 38, at paras. 225-234.
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See generally Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into possible fee-splitting
arrangements between defence counsel and indigent detainees at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/55/759, paras
54-61,1 February 2001 [hereinafter Fee-Splitting Report].
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chambers,87 to take more motions in writing (eliminating the extra time needed for
courtroom proceedings), and to render more instantaneous oral decisions when motions
were made during proceedings to avoid extended interruptions.88
While none of these administrative difficulties is particular to the ad hoc tribunals,
the problem of fee splitting might be. In February 2001, OIOS looked into rumors of feesplitting in both the ICTR and ICTY. No direct, cash-based fee-splitting was initially
uncovered, but other indirect kinds of fee-sharing were found.89 These included hiring of
relatives or friends of the accused as defense personnel (thus funneling some of the funds
paid to the defense by the UN back into the family of the accused),90 gifts to the
accused,91 and gifts to the families of the accused.92
A second report the following year uncovered more substantial misconduct. In one
case, the defense lawyer agreed in 2000 to pay the accused $2500 a month from his
salary. The lawyer never made any such payments, but also failed to inform the Registry
of these improprieties until 2001.93 The same lawyer was caught instructing a legal
assistant to “make necessary ‘alterations’ to ‘maximize payment’” for his services for
Nov. 2001.94 Another lawyer was asked to pay $5000 monthly to the accused. The
lawyer only reported this illegal request after the accused sought to have the lawyer
removed from the case.95 Clearly this kind of corruption diverted ICTR’s money away
from more pressing needs, took time and effort to investigate and rectify, and may have
also provided yet another incentive for dilatory tactics in the courtroom: if defense
counsel were going to have to share, they were simply going to have to make more
money.
The fact that these corrupt practices existed at all suggests that the Registry was at
best sleeping on the watch. The OIOS report describing these three situations noted the
Registry’s failure to deal with the first two situations quickly and appropriately.96 Worse
yet, at least one member of the Registry’s administrative staff was actively involved in
fiscal misconduct with defense counsel. This staff member, when confronted, admitted
that he had requested and received bribes, often in excess of $1000 each, to expedite
payment and/or to approve spurious bills for defense services.97
Attempts to deal with fee sharing and similar billing issues have included strictly
enforced limits on gifts from lawyers to the families of the accused, and the dismissal of
at least one defense lawyer for submitting inflated billing information.98 Article 5 bis of
87
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the Code of Conduct for Defense Counsel was also altered to require defense attorneys to
refuse any overtures to fee splitting and to report them to the Registrar for investigation.99
Needless to say these corrupt practices, the time and money spent dealing with them, and
the perverse incentives they created for defense lawyers to stretch out proceedings have
been a serious drain on the ICTR’s resources that would have been better spent on
moving trials forward.
E. Rules and Plea Bargaining
¶36

As the Expert Group noted in 1999, the law to be applied at ICTR was necessarily
unclear, partly due to the lack of precedent.100 As the ICTR has gained experience, the
judges have altered some rules of procedure to remedy certain problems. Some of these
rule changes have significant potential to speed up cases.
¶37
Several rule changes at the Tribunal’s 12th plenary session (2002) may speed the
work along. Rule 11bis was added to allow the ICTR to transfer cases to national courts
under certain circumstances, which will allow the ICTR to focus only on the cases it
deems most important without sacrificing other cases.101 Until 2002, the Tribunal was
handicapped by an all-or-nothing approach, illustrated by the Ntuyahaga102 case, where
the trial chamber allowed OTP to drop the charges against the accused, but did not allow
the transfer of the case to, e.g., Tanzania or Belgium, essentially allowing the accused to
escape with no trial.103 Rule 11 bis may satisfy many interested parties by increasing the
number of accused who can be tried for crimes in Rwanda, while allowing ICTR to
continue its emphasis on “big fish.”
¶38
Rule 92 bis also improves the availability of evidence by allowing in non-oral
(i.e., written) form evidence that “seeks to prove a matter other than the acts and conduct
of the accused as charged in the indictment.”104 The “other matter” restriction protects the
right of the accused to face the person testifying against him or her, but the admission of
written statements promises to make more information available by decreasing the
ICTR’s dependence on the willingness or ability of witnesses to physically come to
Arusha (e.g., expert witnesses from Belgium, or survivors living in Rwanda), and to
significantly decrease the time it would take in court to adduce the same evidence orally.

http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2002/299e.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005) and ICTR Press
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ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Nzirorera’s Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel, 3 October 2001 available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Nzirorera/decisions/031001.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
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¶39

One final development of extreme importance has been the addition to the rules of
a provision for plea bargaining.105 One senior OTP official, speaking on condition of
anonymity, noted: “The second largest cause of delay in my humble opinion is the failure
to facilitate guilty pleas, which now results in trials [sic] of every accused as well as the
loss of potential 'insider' witnesses who could otherwise strengthen the cases and
therefore speed them up.”106 As noted earlier, only 3 accused thus far have pled guilty.107
The first of the three, Jean Kambanda, was the Prime Minister of Rwanda during the
genocide. Apparently hoping for leniency in sentencing, Kambanda provided substantial
information in his confession that could have helped other prosecutions and agreed to
cooperate with the ICTR in future cases. His confession was taken as a mitigating factor
for sentencing, but its mitigating effect was overridden by the aggravating factors of the
crimes he had actually committed.108 Moreover, as the Prime Minister of the country and
a primary architect of the atrocities, it was felt that to give Kambanda anything less than
the maximum sentence of life imprisonment, regardless of the value of his information,
would be a travesty. When the life sentence was delivered, Kambanda immediately
ceased all cooperation with the tribunal and attempted to retract his guilty plea.109
¶40
The other two defendants who have pled guilty, Omar Serushago and Georges
Ruggiu, also pledged to assist the ICTR in future cases. In all three cases, the accused
was given no promise of reduced sentence, but because the testimony of the accused put
all of their families in danger, the ICTR did offer all three some form of protection for
their families.110 However, unlike Kambanda, Serushago and Ruggiu used their
confessions as opportunities to express remorse for their deeds. Both were given
relatively lighter sentences than the Prosecution had suggested—Serushago was the first
accused to receive less than a life sentence (fifteen years), and Ruggiu, who was
sentenced to twelve years, was the first ICTR defendant who did not appeal his
sentence.111 Both have testified in subsequent trials.
¶41
.Because of the Tribunal’s record of convictions, the ever-increasing accrual of
evidence, and the increasing efficiency of investigations and prosecutions, it might be
reasoned that more defendants who are indeed guilty of the offences charged will be
willing to admit as much (rather than put the Prosecution to its proof) than in the
Tribunal’s early years. Of course the accused are innocent until proven guilty, but it must
be remembered that OTP selects whom it will prosecute, partly based on the strength of
the evidence against an individual. Thus, if OTP has gone so far as to bring a person to
court, it can be assumed that evidence against that person is already fairly strong, or else
OTP would not risk wasting its limited time and resources.112 In the urgent atmosphere of
105

Eighth Annual Report, supra note 53, para. 47
Private correspondence via email, on file with author.
107
Supra note 9.
108
The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, ICTR Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Part C, 4
September 1998, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Kambanda/judgement/kambanda.html
(last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
109
For a general discussion of Kambanda’s guilty plea, see Nancy Armoury Combs, Copping a Plea to
Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L.REV. 1, 128-133. Combs also points
out that In the early days, the contours of the law were less clear, which may have made going to trial a
more promising prospect.
110
Id. at 138.
111
See generally id. at 128-138
112
Id. at 63.
106

Copyright 2005 Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights

Volume 3 (Spring 2005)

the Tribunal’s final years, plea bargaining holds especially important potential for
speeding the court along and saving countless sums in defense and administrative costs.
While negotiating a plea deal may take some time, it has been estimated that the court
can verify and accept a guilty plea in about a day’s time.114
¶42
The issue of plea bargaining takes on special moral significance in these latter days
of the ICTR. Earlier in the history of the ad hoc tribunals, it was generally felt that the
crimes committed by the accused were too heinous to allow them to bargain for a
conviction that did not accurately reflect their deeds. During his presidency of the ICTY,
Antonio Cassese stated this position thus:
The persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide, torture,
murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution and other inhuman
acts. After due reflection, we have decided that no one should be immune
from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their
testimony may otherwise be.115
¶43

While this ethical consideration is no less true now than it was earlier, in the final
days of the Tribunal it may reasoned that “something is better than nothing.” This is true
for the practical reason that ICTR trials are “exceedingly lengthy, costly, and complex,”
and plea bargaining offers an opportunity to streamline at least some of these cases.116 If
the goal of the recent changes at ICTR has been to expedite the resolution of cases and to
complete as much work as possible before the Tribunal’s mandate expires, then the time
for plea bargaining has come.
¶44
In addition to practical reasons of expediency, plea bargaining has additional
benefits as well. As a corollary to Judge Cassese’s opinion above, the heinous crimes of
which ICTR defendants are accused would not seem appropriate candidates for plea
bargaining except that the ICTR’s mandate is broader than the simple prosecution of
criminals. The ICTR also exists to establish a historical record of the atrocities and to
promote reconciliation. The use of plea bargaining, inasmuch as it can convince the
accused to “spill the beans,” can result in a much fuller record of fact. Equally as
important, the facts gained through a guilty plea are facts admitted openly by an accused,
which may contribute more to the process of conciliation than those facts which are
found and reported by judicial decisions.117
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F. Judges
¶45

One third factor impacting (for better or worse) the speed of the ICTR’s work has
been the judges themselves. Several recent developments regarding judges have indeed
been controversial, but nonetheless offer the promise of accelerating the work to be done.
¶46
The usual selection process for judges is defined by Article 12 of the ICTR’s
statute: the UN General Assembly elects judges to four year terms from a shortlist
prepared by the Security Council. 120 Judges may be re-elected. Six judges for the ICTR
were elected in mid-1995,121 and upon the request of ICTR President Kama in 1997, three
more were elected in 1998 to compose a third trial chamber.122
¶47
Pursuant to Article 14 of the Statute,123 the judges of the Tribunal make the Rules
of Procedure. Many of the rules they have promulgated are aimed at maintaining smooth
and efficient judicial functions. Fairly early in their tenure, the judges wisely included in
the rules of procedure provisions to deal with changes in the composition of Chambers.
Rule 14 bis allows judges to “continue to discharge their duties until their places have
been filled.”124 Rule 15 was also written and later modified to deal with the possibility of
judges’ extended absence for such reasons as sickness. Rule 15 (E) deals with brief
absences by authorizing the presiding judge of that particular chamber to simply adjourn.
In longer absences, however, the President of the Tribunal is to assign another judge and
proceed with the case (as long as the accused consents). Rule 15 (F) was added in June
1998, allowing the President to authorize a Chamber to carry on with “routine matters,
such as the delivery of decisions” even in the extended absence of one of the judges.125
Further amendments were made in 2000 to allow single judges to handle initial
appearances, to allow the judge who confirmed an indictment to also hear the merits of
the resulting case, and to allow the President to make administrative Practice Directions
(notably solidifying the subordination of the Registry to the Chambers).126 However,
even with these provisions the judges soon found that there were simply too few of them
to deal with the number of cases efficiently. Moreover, although one judge could
118
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temporarily fill in for another, the substitution process would necessarily create a drain on
the Chamber from which that judge was “borrowed.” As early as 1996, judges in both ad
hoc tribunals submitted a joint request to the Security Council to have a larger pool of
judges.127 The Security Council rejected the Tribunals’ suggestion that the judges should
be temporarily interchangeable between the Hague and Arusha to expedite cases,
responding that this would destroy “the distinction between the two tribunals which are
separate entities, and the separation of the Appeals Chamber from the Trial
Chambers.”128 The Security Council’s decision necessitated the ICTR’s request to simply
add a third chamber, to which the Security Council acquiesced.129
¶48
Because the Rules allow for a judge to continue sitting even after s/he has been
replaced, it is theoretically possible to have more than the allotted number of judges
working at the same time. Since this would necessarily increase the funding required by
the Tribunal, the Security Council retains the right to define the conditions of the
outgoing judge’s stay. The terms of eleven judges expired on May 23, 2003. Four of them
were not reelected: Pillay (South Africa), who will become a judge of the ICC, Maqutu
(Lesotho), Ostrovsky (Russia), and Dolenc (Slovenia). The Security Council authorized
all of them to continue hearing cases, with one unique qualification.130 Judge Pillay’s
tenure in Chamber 1 was extended to finish the Media case131 by December 2003, and
Judges Ostrovsky and Dolenc were authorized to remain on the Cyangugu case132 until
February 2004. Judge Maqutu’s tenure was extended until December 2003 to finish the
Kajelijeli133 and Kamuhanda134 cases. All of the above cases were relatively near to
completion. However, Judge Maqutu was also sitting on the Butare case regarding six
accused in Butare prefecture.135 The Butare case includes Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the
first woman ever accused of rape as crime against humanity.136 As Judge Maqutu’s term
was not extended for the Butare case, a series of negotiations became necessary. Under
rule 15 bis (D), the accused must consent for the case to continue with a different judge.
127
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Negotiating this consent, however, turned out to be quite a challenge because there were
six defendants. Only one of the accused, Sylvain Nsabimana, eventually consented to
continue.137 The defense was given until July 4, 2003 to submit their arguments as to how
to proceed. The remaining judges, Sekule (Tanzania) and Ramaroson (Madagascar) ruled
that the trial should continue with another judge “in the interests of justice,” and defense
appealed.138 The appeals chamber held that the decision was within the discretion of the
trial judges, and that they had indeed ruled in the interest of justice.139
¶49
While the highly unusual Butare situation clearly presented a significant obstacle
for the Tribunal, it nonetheless helped resolve how to efficiently deal with the reelection
process. With that issue clarified, the most important event of the summer for the
Chambers was the approval by the Security Council of eighteen ad litem judges. The
possibility of using temporary judges had been advanced in 1999 by an Expert Group
assembled to review the functioning of the ICTR and ICTY.140 The Expert Group
contemplated the use of former judges of either tribunal, but President Pillay in her late
2001 request for a pool of ad litem judges did not specify such a qualification.141
President Pillay reiterated her request in her annual report of July 2, 2002, noting in
delicate language that the two ad hoc tribunals must be treated equally, and in notably
stronger language that the addition of additional judges was the only way ICTR would
ever finish its work.142 Her point was unstated but nonetheless clear: the ICTY already
had the nine ad litem judges it had requested, and the ICTR was taking backseat. The
Security Council finally acquiesced with Resolution 1321 on August 14, 2002, providing
for a pool of eighteen ad litem judges. However, whereas the ICTR had requested for
nine ad litem judges to be allowed to sit at any given time, the Security Council only
approved four.143 The judges were elected on June 25, 2003, and as of September 1,
2003, the first of these began sitting on the Ndindabahizi trial,144 and another would soon
take the place of Judge Maqutu in the Butare case.145 Simple arithmetic shows the poor
logic of this decision; if one ad litem judge must sit with two permanent judges, then only
four trial chamber sections could be created. The (then) new President of the Tribunal,
Erik Møse, wrote on September 29, 2003146 to ask the Security Council to authorize five
more ad litem judges, showing that with the resulting six sections the court could most
137
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likely complete its anticipated case load by 2008 as the Security Council had instructed in
Resolution 1503 (2003).147 The Security Council granted his request on October 27, 2003
with Resolution 1512 (2003), which amended Articles 11 and 12 of the Tribunal Statute
to allow nine ad litem judges.148 President Møse’s letter also described the system of
twin-tracking courtroom shifts to be used: each section will hear one “large” case and one
“small” case simultaneously, and courtrooms will be used by two different cases in the
mornings and afternoons. In order for the shift system to work, there would have to be
enough sections so that no judge would be on a case from morning until night. While
twin-tracking and shifting would mean that a larger number of cases will be heard, each
individual case will have to take longer due to switching off with another case, and the
Tribunal’s resources (such as translation services) will have to be at full speed to
accommodate the increased workload.149
V. RELATIONS BETWEEN RWANDA AND “ITS” TRIBUNAL
¶50

This article has addressed several issues at the ICTR that have negatively affected
the Tribunal’s output and some attempts to rectify them. At first glance, the decision to
replace Carla del Ponte might be thought to have been another such attempt at moving
things along. However, other factors have been examined at such length because the
major event of this summer, and the focus of this submission, may seem somewhat out of
place considering that so many other problems appear to have been resolved, clearing the
way for a strong finish at ICTR.
¶51
The relationship of the ICTR at large with Rwanda is so closely connected to the
practices and person of the Prosecutor herself that it can be difficult to separate one
relationship from the other. Moreover, delays at the Tribunal and acrimonious
relationships with Rwanda seem to be part of one cycle which further compounds the
identity of the ICTR as a whole with the individual Prosecutor—Rwanda responds to
delays at the ICTR (in general) by ceasing to cooperate with its primary representative in
Rwanda, the OTP, with the individual Prosecutor as its head., which in turn causes more
delays. As will be fleshed out in the following section, “Rwanda” means not only the
government but also survivors’ groups such as IBUKA and AVEGA and post-genocide
Rwandan society at large.
¶52
It is a well-known irony that, despite having requested the Tribunal, Rwanda was
the only country to vote against Resolution 955 establishing it. By a twist of fate, Rwanda
had a seat on the Security Council at the time, and its representative expressed the new
government’s concern that the masterminds of the genocide would only be punished by
imprisonment. Nonetheless, Rwanda pledged its cooperation. Further, because the ICTR
and ICTY had been established for the sake of legitimacy and expediency under the
Security Council’s Chapter VII powers rather than by optional assent to a treaty, all state
members of the United Nations (including Rwanda) were obliged to cooperate with the
Tribunals regardless of their disposition.150 As violence continued around Rwanda’s
147
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borders in 1995 (especially in connection with refugee camps inhabited by Hutus fleeing
the victorious RPF), the Security Council also issued Resolution 978151 reminding all
states of this duty. Thus it is abundantly clear that any failure by the Rwandan
government to cooperate with the ICTR is a breach of its international obligations—but
what if the Tribunal, ostensibly created for Rwanda’s sake, displeases Rwanda? What,
one might ask, is a sovereign nation to do?
¶53
It is almost unnecessary to examine the degree to which the ICTR’s slowness has
irritated Rwanda. However, as it is the Prosecutor whose staff operates in Kigali, and the
Prosecutor’s subordinates upon whom Rwanda most directly depends for its vindication
(through convictions and through the establishment of historical fact), the office and
person of the Prosecutor is both an extremely precarious position and a particularly easy
target for Rwanda’s frustration. It is also true that as one individual subject to
reappointment every four years, the Prosecutor’s job is perhaps the single position within
the two Tribunals that is most vulnerable to politics. All the delays described above,
while symptomatic to the Tribunal at large, when combined with several problems within
OTP which are described below, have the effect of making it appear as though the
Prosecutor him- or herself has failed Rwanda. As this paper focuses on the decision to
dismiss Carla del Ponte personally as well as to split the statutory mandate of her office,
this analysis is resticted as much as possible to events within her own tenure.
¶54
Richard Goldstone may be viewed as the Prosecutor who got the ball rolling in
Arusha.152 Next, Louise Arbour 153 oversaw the substantial development of the ICTR’s
various capacities, and, as much as possible, attempted to rectify the serious problems of
incompetence within her staff.154 Arbour’s tenure also saw the exceptionally crafty
capture of a number of suspects by the use of secret indictments and investigations.155
However, Carla del Ponte inherited Arbour’s persistently underskilled staff as well as a
failed “national indictment,” which attempted to place twenty-nine Rwandan accused on
one indictment under a Nuremberg-style theory of criminal conspiracy.156 The practice of
joining indictments had been used previously as one means of consolidating trials to
conserve resources and save time where the same witnesses and same patterns of fact
could be used against multiple accused,157 but the inclusion of twenty-nine individuals,
mostly government figures, was simply too broad. One of del Ponte’s first tasks upon
arrival in 1999 was to completely reorganize the prosecution strategy by breaking up the
one “super-indictment” into internally consistent, manageable, smaller groups. The work
required to assemble Arbour’s twenty-nine-person national indictment strategy had
such threats, the Security Council may then call on members of the UN to cooperate with its chosen plan of
action to deal with such threats.
151
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drawn OTP’s resources away from other cases in progress, so del Ponte had the
additional disadvantage of inheriting an office well behind schedule already.158 And, as
noted before, she took up her post in the aftermath of the Appeals Chamber order to
release Barayagwiza. She also walked into a firestorm of controversy over what was
referred to in this author’s experience as “the famous laughing case,” where, during
testimony by a victim about sexual assault, judges and defense counsel engaged in “jovial
banter” and a judge may even have laughed aloud.159
¶55
The immediate about-face in Rwanda’s approach to OTP once del Ponte
reclaimed the Barayagwiza trial showed quite clearly that Rwanda was willing to use its
power to manipulate the Tribunal and that it would openly direct its ire at the Prosecutor
personally. Of course, the appeals chamber had suggested that OTP had been derelict in
its duties160 —but the outcome of Barayagwiza’s appeal had virtually nothing to do with
del Ponte’s own competence or her personal agenda, as she had only recently taken
office. Rwanda already appeared to be grasping for straws to exert its influence.
¶56
Several other crises during del Ponte’s tenure have poisoned relations with Rwanda
and the Tribunal. One of these was the acquittal of Ignace Bagilishema, which del Ponte
attributed to the incompetence of her subordinate who was promptly fired. She also fired
the deputy prosecutor, who at the time was based in Kigali.161 Del Ponte was confident
that she could take back Bagilishema on appeal, but was mistaken. 162 Another episode
was the discovery that persons wanted for genocide by the Rwandan government had
actually been employed by the Tribunal as investigators.163 And finally, 2002 saw
survivors’ groups and the Rwandan government accuse the Tribunal of failing to
sufficiently protect witnesses.
¶57
The concerns about wanted genocidaires working at the Tribunal were closely
linked to other concerns related to witness protection—it was ethically wrong for such
suspects to be on the staff, and it represented a glaring administrative mistake, but it also
threatened to destroy the critical anonymity of the witnesses themselves. Upon the
Rwandan government’s criticism of the Tribunal’s witness protection, the Registrar
(Adama Dieng) invited the government in March, 2002 to compose a joint panel to
investigate. However, Dieng withdrew this invitation shortly thereafter, as he quickly
realized that Rwanda’s demands for such an inquiry were far too expansive, at least with
reference to his own statutory powers. Dieng also expressed regret that Rwanda’s
demands displayed a lack of respect for the judicial independence of the Tribunal. 165
158
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¶58

There appears to be some substance to Rwanda’s ongoing concerns about the
safety of witnesses. In December 1996, a witness was killed with his daughter, brother,
nephew and seven others. The witness had asked investigators for protection, and was
advised to call the investigators in case of trouble. The nearest telephone was more than
20 miles from his home. The next month, January of 1997, another witness and her entire
family of eight were killed after returning from testifying in Arusha.166 However,
information as to precisely why these people were killed does not appear to be readily
available, i.e., it is not certain whether they were killed in connection with their testimony
or for other, unrelated reasons. It should be noted with regard to these concerns that, like
virtually every other section of the ICTR, the Victim and Witness Protection Unit started
from scratch and has developed its protection capabilities substantially.167
¶59
Relations with the Rwandan government deteriorated yet again later in 2002.
President Pillay had invited Rwanda’s Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General to visit
the Tribunal, and they cancelled their trip on December 10, 2002. President Pillay had
written to the Security Council twice that year, requesting that the Security Council “use
such measures as it deemed appropriate to ensure that the Tribunal could meet its
mandate.”168 This was a thinly veiled request for help in dealing with an increasingly
intransigent Rwanda; two trial chambers had been brought to a standstill by Rwanda’s
refusal to issue travel documents for witnesses to travel to Arusha.169 After Pillay’s
second request for help, the Security Council responded by issuing Resolution 1431 on
August 14, recalling their previous Resolution 955 on 1994 to much the same effect, and
reminding “all states” that they are bound to comply with the Tribunal due to its status as
an organ of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 170
¶60
In July, 2002, Judge Claude Jorda (President of the ICTY) and Carla del Ponte
discussed the Tribunals in a closed session of the Security Council. 171 While the text of
del Ponte’s comments is not publicly available, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda
to the UN addressed a seething response only three days later.172 This document contains
a litany of complaints about the Tribunal, and as such is the most useful source for
examining the “beginning of the end” of Rwanda’s relationship with the Prosecutor. Its
major points are summarized and discussed below.
(1) While the government agreed that certain survivors’ groups had boycotted
the ICTR, the government has not influenced this decision. The boycotts
continued because of the ICTR’s failure to engage in constructive dialogue
to Investigate the Allegations of Mistreatment Coming from Rwanda, March 28, 2002, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2002/9-3-09.htm.
166
Nasser Ega-Musa, Another Failure of Justice in Africa, W ASH. POST , March 06, 1997
167
The nascent character of witness programs was noted in the Paschke Report, supra note 51, at para. 54.
The follow-up report one year later lamented a continuing lack of experienced staff and an inability to
integrate witness management with witness protection. See Follow-Up Report, supra note 59, at 57-62. For
more recent developments, see generally Eighth Annual Report, supra note 53, at paras. 70-72.
168
U.N. Doc. S/2002/847, July 26, 2002; U.N. Doc S/2002/923, August 8 2002.
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with the groups and with the government. (The report also condemns Adama
Dieng for “unilaterally withdr[awing] the offer” to discuss witness protection,
as discussed above.173 )
(2) The accusation that Rwanda had not responded to requests to transfer
witnesses in custody was false. Rwanda cites one case in which the requested
witnesses were wanted in Rwanda’s gacaca proceedings, and authorities
notified ICTR to that effect.174
(3) A “campaign of misinformation”175 has alleged that Rwanda had changed its
requirements for issuing travel documents to witnesses. Rwanda said there
had been no such change except that, whereas it formerly only required a
letter of sponsorship from ICTR, it now required the same submissions from
witnesses as from all other applicants for travel documents. These included,
e.g., a photograph and a certificate that the applicant was not facing any
criminal charges. In justifying this policy, Rwanda took advantage of the
opportunity to take a swing at the ICTR: “the government has had frequent
reports of deaths of witnesses in unexplained circumstances after their
testimony at the ICTR…the Government cannot ensure the protection of
witnesses…without complete information on their identity.”176
(4) Although the Government admitted it had not supplied requested documents
to the ICTR, this was because the request was made on short notice, and the
state of Rwanda’s public records requires time to produce them. Del Ponte’s
allegation that Rwanda might intentionally be withholding information was
dismissed as “most absurd.”177
¶61

The fifth “defensive” section of the Rwandan government’s response addresses
Rwanda’s “alleged failure to cooperate in investigations of human rights violations by the
RPA in 1994,”178 which will be discussed at length later. The response then goes further
by cataloguing the failures of the ICTR, which include:
(1) the low number of adjudications and length of trials, which threatens to
necessitate the release of some suspects, and attendant high costs179
(2) the failure of the ICTR to rein in rampant corruption in multiple areas180
(3) the failure of the ICTR to “reach out” from its erroneous location in
Arusha to the people of Rwanda181
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Id.. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
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(4) the failure of the Tribunal to hold some trials in Rwanda as had been
promised at its inception182
(5) the “clandestine” transfer,183 by the Prosecutor, of her offices to Arusha,
maintaining only a “skeletal presence”184 in Kigali in contravention of the
Statute
(6) the fact that OTP’s appellate attorneys were based in the Hague. This could
not “meet any reasonable objective other than misuse of resources especially
because appeals hearings are normally conducted in Arusha.”185
(7) that the detention facility in Arusha was mismanaged, allowing one detainee
(unnamed) to send threatening emails and one to maintain a website from
within
¶62

In effect, this list of problems seems more like an “affirmative defense” by
Rwanda— a way of saying, as in criminal law, “yes judge, I did it, but here’s why you
should forgive me.” That is, if the aim of Rwanda’s response was to respond to
allegations of non-cooperation, why was it also necessary to describe (in unusually
undiplomatic terms) the failures of the Tribunal? The final section of Rwanda’s response
clearly foreshadows the endgame to come in the summer of 2003—most significantly,
demanding that a Prosecutor be appointed for only Rwanda and that the Rwandan
government and genocide survivors be consulted as to how to resolve the Tribunal’s
problems. According to Rwanda’s statement, all the problems mentioned must be
rectified for the sake of rescuing the ICTR’s credibility in Rwanda.186 This brings us to an
extremely important but uncomfortable point: the Tribunal for Rwanda, as a court of law,
is not, in fact, a Tribunal for Rwanda. It is a court aimed at deciding, in terms of the most
advanced jurisprudence available, whether or not individuals are guilty of specifically
defined crimes. Clearly, these decisions can not be made in a vacuum. But neither should
they be influenced by any other factor than the truth—not even by Rwanda itself.
¶63
Whatever the outcome of the above exchange at the UN, relations with survivor
groups IBUKA and AVEGA remained acrimonious throughout most of 2003.187 Yet
substantial strides were also made in preparing for the final push to finish the Tribunal’s
work. The Eighth Annual Report of the President of the Tribunal to the Security Council
covers July 1, 2002— just before the controversy above—through June 30, 2003,
immediately before the ultimate decisions regarding the Prosecutor. OTP’s strides during
that time (January 2003), included finally hiring a Deputy Prosecutor to replace Bernard
Muna, whom Carla del Ponte had fired. This was Bongani Majola, a South African
lawyer, and unlike Muna, he was indeed stationed at Arusha as the Rwandan government
had lamented. Although this position was absolutely critical for managing prosecutions
while del Ponte remained in the Hague, it had gone unfilled for more than fourteen
months. Melanie Werrett (UK/Zimbabwe) was also hired as Chief of Prosecutions and
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stationed in Arusha as well.188 OTP further refined its completion strategy by whittling
down to 26 the number of suspects left to pursue,189 identifying some 40 suspects to be
“deferred” to various national courts,190 launching its more complex cases, streamlining
the number of witnesses to be called, and stepping up its level of activity in general in
order to prepare for the increased caseload that would result as the newly approved ad
litem judges arrived.
¶64
Within the registry, numerous adjustments were made and an “External Relations
and Strategic Planning Section” created to facilitate cooperation with Rwanda, civil
society groups, etc.191 The African Union, with its rhetorical emphasis on human
rights,192 launched in Durban on July 9, 2002. Registrar Adama Dieng attended the
summit to promote the ICTR and push for the formation of a trust fund for victims, but
was unable to secure a resolution pledging greater support from the new organization due
to time constraints.193 However, he was notably able to visit Kigali in March, 2003 on a
sort of goodwill tour. Dieng met with high-ranking officials of several Rwandan
government agencies to promote cooperation, and visited “solidarity camps” and
memorial sites.194
¶65
Just before the decision was made to replace Carla del Ponte, relations with
Rwanda seemed to be on an upswing. The spokesman of the Tribunal and the chief of the
newly formed External Relations and Strategic Planning Section, Roland Amoussaga,
visited Rwanda for five days in July, 2003. Amoussaga met with representatives of the
survivors groups, politicians, human rights figures, and the Prosecutor General of the
Rwandan Supreme Court, Gerald Gahima. The “ice-breaking” talks were “candid and
cordial” and were intended to “revive, pursue, and develop a better and harmonious
working relationship” with the Rwandan parties.197 Nonetheless, this and other positive
developments of 2003 do not appear to have repaired the years of struggle already
discussed in this article.
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A. The Decision is Made
¶66

As mentioned above, one way to effect a significant change at the ICTR is by
changing the Prosecutor. And if this is going to be done, it can be accomplished most
simply at the end of the Prosecutor’s mandate. Thus, regardless of the roller-coaster
relationships which I have been describing between the ICTR, Rwanda, and Carla del
Ponte personally, August was the last available opportunity to take advantage of that one
possibility. Indeed, Kofi Annan made a statement in late July that struck many at the
ICTR as strange: he announced, before the decision was made to dismiss del Ponte, that
the time had come to split the Prosecutor’s mandate.198 In Arusha’s OTP hallways, it was
taken as a foregone conclusion that the decision to dismiss “the boss” had already been
made, or Annan would have refrained from making such a statement prematurely. In
Annan’s opinion, it was important that whoever was at the helm of prosecutions during
the final stages of the two Tribunals be able to devote him or herself entirely to a single
cause. His statement appears diplomatically worded to avoid the insinuation that Rwanda
was the squeaky wheel needing the grease. Indeed, neither the statement nor the
resolutions establishing the resulting two mandates made any insinuation that the ICTR
had “underperformed.”
¶67
Annan’s logic is difficult to dispute. Aside from the inevitable lag time it will take
to orient del Ponte’s successor, Hassan Jallow of the Gambia, and to complete whatever
reorganizations are necessary, it stands to reason that having a leader on site will be more
efficient than having one who must shuttle back and forth to Holland and run another,
equally complex tribunal for Yugoslavia at the same time. Moreover, the office of the
Prosecutor is perhaps the most influential factor in deciding who gets arrested,
prosecuted, and convicted or acquitted, because the Prosecutor makes the ultimate call on
whom OTP prosecutes and then directs the cases against them. Thus it is exceptionally
important to have a devoted and competent person in that office, and the turnover which
has now occurred was essentially the last chance to make any change before the ICTR’s
time expires. Whoever emerged from the debate as the last Prosecutor would be the
person who sealed the ICTR’s place in history as either a success or a failure. Mr. Jallow
comes to ICTR from a position as a judge on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a hybrid
UN/domestic body that is widely lauded as a more efficient model for tribunals and one
that appears to have learned many lessons from the ICTR. 199 At least one critic has
indeed attributed the relative success of the SCSL to the efficiency of its Prosecutor,
David Crane of the US, which suggests that Mr. Jallow may have had the opportunity to
learn some lessons from the SCSL as well.200 It may also turn out to be significant that
198
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Mr. Jallow is African, providing a sort of cultural understanding that will facilitate the
sensitive work of inter-African cooperation on such matters as investigations, arrests, and
extraditions.
¶68
Perhaps most importantly, Mr. Jallow is well acquainted with the ICTR’s various
handicaps because he was a member of the “Expert Group” [to Review the Effective
Operation and Functioning of the ICTR and ICTY] which thoroughly investigated both
the ICTR and ICTY in 1999. Notably, the Expert Group announced in January 2000 that
“midway in the life of both ad hoc tribunals…there was no compelling reason to
recommend an amendment of the Statute to provide a separate Prosecutor for the
ICTR.”201 The Expert Group found that, were the ICTR and ICTY being created anew, it
would be logical to consider having two separate Prosecutors.202 However, at the time of
the report, the tribunals were working with “a solid body of five years of experience”203
which was performing reasonably well, consistent with the report’s general suggestion
that many of the delays in both tribunals had been inevitable given their novel and unique
character.204
B. The Idea of A Separate Prosecutor
¶69

As evidenced by the Expert Group Report, the idea of a separate Prosecutor for
ICTR has been around for some time. Rwanda had requested a separate Prosecutor at the
very outset,205 and it seems obvious that it may have been wise at the very outset to
provide one, but using Justice Goldstone for both had several advantages. First, it avoided
the delay of finding someone equally as qualified as Goldstone to handle Rwanda—and
as noted earlier, in the first days of ICTR, any additional delay would have been
politically unseemly. Next, a single Prosecutor held the promise of a unified strategy and
a unified understanding of the work to be done for both Tribunals. The next possible
juncture to split the mandate would have been when Goldstone was replaced by Louise
Arbour in 1994, but it might be reasoned that ICTR had barely gotten off the ground, and
to put in a new person may have damaged the ICTR in the bud. It may also have simply
been too early to assess whether the one-person strategy was working properly.
Alternatively, of course, this may have been the very best time to make the move, so that
the crucial years of the ICTR’s development would have been guided by a single, focused
leader. The next opportunity to assign a Prosecutor for Rwanda came when Louise
Arbour departed in 1999 and was replaced by Carla del Ponte. If a Prosecutor for Rwanda
was seriously being considered at that point, the Expert Report was poorly timed, as it
came about a month after del Ponte had already been installed. Nonetheless, the Report’s
relatively rosy assessment of the issue must have comforted the Security Council that all
was going to plan.
¶70
At least one member of the Security Council had recognized by 1999 that a
dedicated Prosecutor for Rwanda was a superior idea. According to the United Kingdom
201
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mission to the UN, the UK had been a proponent of a separate Prosecutor at least this
early for several reasons.206 The UK’s support for the idea had nothing to do with the
person of the Prosecutor, but rather several pragmatic factors: first, that the work load
simply demanded a person who could be physically present. Next, there was a need to
combat a public perception that Rwanda was continuing to get less attention from the
UN. This was of particular importance considering the predominant perception that many
of the atrocities in Rwanda had occurred as a result of the UN’s earlier inattention.
¶71
The opportunity to select a dedicated Prosecutor for Rwanda has only presented
itself four times. Considering the continued low output of the ICTR between the most
recent times the issue has presented itself, the entire Security Council seems to have
come around to the UK’s way of thinking (this is not to suggest, of course, that the UK
was more responsible for the decision than any other state). A diplomatic source in the
Russian Federation mission to the UN confirmed that his country simply felt that a
separate Prosecutor would be more effective, as did a legal officer in the Chinese
mission.207
C. Ulterior Motives?
¶72

All these affirmative reasons to install a dedicated Prosecutor for Rwanda
notwithstanding, it simply seems all too expedient for the predominately Tutsi Rwandan
government, naturally comprised of many former RPA figures,208 to have secured the
dismissal of a Prosecutor actively engaged in investigating war crimes the RPA may have
committed in taking Rwanda and toppling the genocidal Interim Government. It must be
noted, of course, that there is nothing to suggest acts of genocide by the RPA (i.e., against
Hutus), but it was established even before the Tribunal was created that the RPA broke
certain rules of war.209 In negotiating the Tribunal’s statute, the Rwandan government
had strongly opposed a broad mandate, arguing that the focus should be on “the crime of
crimes,” genocide—which, although it may have committed other crimes, the RPF had
not committed.210 A cynical observer might reason that the new government could easily
foresee the prosecution of RPA war crimes and argued for a narrow mandate to obviate
exactly that possibility. Rwanda’s efforts notwithstanding, the Tribunal’s mandate does
not in any way limit the Prosecution from pursuing possible crimes of the RPF as it does
not name any specific perpetrators. Indeed, if the Tribunal is to deal with the entire
Rwandan tragedy, it may be of historical and equitable value to prosecute Tutsi war
criminals as well as those committed by Hutus.
¶73
Investigating crimes by the RPF has been a theme of del Ponte’s entire mandate,
beginning shortly after her arrival at ICTR. Louise Arbour had publicly stated that she
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felt such investigations were necessary,211 but according to Diplomatie Judiciare, opinion
at ICTR was that the task was “officially impossible” because of the risk that Rwanda
would have used its power to shut the entire Tribunal down in retaliation.212 However, in
the aftermath of the Barayagwiza fiasco, it was claimed that del Ponte had so finessed
relations with Rwanda that investigating the RPF had become a possibility.213 She
broached the topic (without naming any suspects) with Rwandan President Paul Kagame,
who had been the leader of the RPF/RPA before taking office, again focusing on the
“bigger fish” (such as the RPA military leadership, some of whom would have been
rewarded for their service to the RPA with positions in Kagame’s government) rather
than the “smaller fry.” Diplomatie Judiciare and other commentators credited del Ponte’s
initiative as a symbol of a new power dynamic between the ICTR and Rwanda, an
assertion of the Tribunal’s, and her own, independence.214 Other commentators
applauded the move, noting that the prosecution of only Hutus, when Tutsis had also
committed crimes, including attacking refugees from Rwanda living in Zaire, made the
ICTR look like victor’s justice.215
¶74
Thus investigations began, and caused tensions between the ICTR and Rwanda
throughout del Ponte’s mandate. These tensions came to a head in December 2002, after
del Ponte met in the Hague with members of exiled Rwandan opposition groups
considered by Rwanda to be implicated in the genocide, ostensibly to gather information
about possible RPF crimes.216 A statement by Rwandan authorities alleged that by
meeting these parties she had “lost the moral authority to handle cases related to the
Rwandan genocide.”217 Del Ponte fired back in a speech to members of Britain’s
parliament, saying that Rwanda was being uncooperative because “we have real reason to
believe that powerful elements in Rwanda are vehemently opposed to the investigations
[of alleged RPA crimes].”218 In interviews with Diplomatie Judiciare, del Ponte also
reiterated that Rwanda had no influence whatsoever over whom she may or may not
meet, and that Rwanda was only objecting to that particular meeting because it had
become politically expedient to call for her resignation.
¶75
At the time of this crisis, there had been a two-and-a-half month break in
investigations of the RPF. Del Ponte made clear that, although the Rwandan government,
particularly the military, had refused to cooperate with the investigations, the break was
purely for practical reasons such as the departure of staff, and should not be seen as any
kind of capitulation by OTP. 219 Investigations had already resumed in November 2002,
and del Ponte already had drafts of indictments that she planned to release when OTP had
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gathered enough evidence. While she had expressed a goal of issuing RPF indictments by
the end of 2002, this was not to be.220
¶76
Del Ponte was scheduled to meet with various officials in Arusha a few days after
her address in London, but the Rwandan authorities cancelled and insisted that Pierre
Richard Prosper, the US Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, be present at any
negotiations scheduled for the future. Rwanda’s withdrawal prompted President Pillay’s
letter to the Security Council asking for help mentioned earlier. Commenting on del
Ponte’s recent actions, Rwanda’s Justice Minister, Jean de Dieu Mucyo, raised several
concerns in a single statement:
She wants to play the game of balance, doubtless because of political
pressure. But how can she compare Bagosora221 to a [RPA] soldier who
killed a neighbor whom he suspected of having killed his family? These
are clearly crimes, but can they really be compared to genocide? What’s
more, our legal system is dealing with the case [sic] and people have
already been tried and convicted.222
Mucyo also stated that del Ponte was “inexplicably…mixing politics and justice”223
and that Rwanda had “difficulties with individuals and not with the institution,”224 hinting
at Rwanda’s personal animus towards the person of the Prosecutor.
¶78
On the same day as Mucyo’s statements, del Ponte criticized Kigali for trying to
inject its own political agenda into her work and stated that the Rwandan government had
actually intimated to her in private that the real reason for Kigali’s outrage over her
meeting the exile groups had indeed been indignation over her RPF investigations.225 As
if responding to Mucyo, she stated that she was indeed working on limited resources, and
that as a result genocide trials had to remain top priority, with RPF investigations coming
second and at a different pace.226 Nonetheless, she intended to bring all of her indictments
by 2004 (apparently assuming that she would still be at her post).227
¶79
Rwanda finally got its meeting between del Ponte, Justice Minister Gahima, and
Pierre Richard Prosper in June, prompting speculation that del Ponte had bowed to
Rwanda’s pressure and cancelled RPF investigations. Her staff refuted the idea as
“absolutely false,” noting that no such deal could be struck through negotiation, and that
even though Rwanda had the right to carry out RPF investigations itself, the ICTR has
primacy over any such domestic jurisdiction. OTP was in fact still conducting
investigations. 228
¶77
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D. Endgame
¶80

Del Ponte had stated in December, 2002 that she would seek a second term to
continue her work at ICTR and ICTY because she was busy in both, apparently not
contemplating that she might find herself working on one and not the other. Not
surprisingly given all the controversies I have described in this paper, Rwanda had
already begun to suggest that she should not get that second mandate. Speculation
abounds that Rwanda supported the dismissal of Carla del Ponte from the ICTR as an
attempt to avoid further investigation into the possible crimes of the RPF/RPA and as an
ad hominem attack on the personification of poor relations with the Tribunal.229 This
appears to have been the suspicion of human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch,
who wrote to the Security Council on August 7, 2003, acknowledging legitimate
concerns regarding management and/or efficiency, but urging the members to “ensure
that changes do not undermine the independence and impartiality of the ICTR, including
in prosecuting…members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army.”230
¶81
After Kofi Annan’s July 28, 2003 announcement recommending del Ponte’s
replacement, Rwanda registered its support for the idea. A statement from Rwanda’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was submitted to the Security Council just one day before del
Ponte was to appear to discuss Annan’s proposal. The statement expressed Rwanda’s
concerns over inefficiency and the lack of attention paid to ICTR and Rwanda, as well as
the “usual suspects:” incompetence, corruption, fee-splitting, nepotism, etc. Del Ponte, in
the closed session the next day, mentioned in her own defense the possibility that
replacing her would derail the RPA investigations.231 The Security Council was
unconvinced.
VI. CONCLUSION
¶82

It seems clear that by dedication and physical presence, a new Prosecutor for
Rwanda may be able to alleviate some of the problems discussed in this paper.
Furthermore, one might even speculate that the cost of hiring another individual
altogether might not be much more than the cost of shuttling one Prosecutor back and
forth across the globe. So, considering that efficiency is and should be a primary concern
motivating the Security Council, it is difficult to dispute that the decision taken this
August was the correct one. This said, however, it also appears that Carla del Ponte may
have been an unfortunate scapegoat. As described in this article, many of the ICTR’s
problems which irritated Rwanda and the international community had very little to do
with the Prosecutor herself. Del Ponte, with arguably the Tribunal’s “dirtiest work,” and
one of few top officials who interacted with Rwanda (as well as the UN Security
Council) directly, served as a lightning rod for these frustrations which were not of her
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own making. Several other problems, such as issues with infrastructure like translation
equipment, were just nearing resolution when del Ponte lost half her job. This may not
have any bearing on the validity of the decision to replace del Ponte, but as a person who
has worked at the Tribunal, this author would sympathize with a saddened del Ponte who
might have felt she was just about to hit her stride.
¶83
The new Prosecutor, Hassan Bubacar Jallow, has been hailed as an excellent
choice for his job.232 It is also a credit to the Security Council that a replacement for del
Ponte was found with a speed almost unknown in the UN, thus preempting what could
have been a disaster if the position had gone unfilled for any length of time. However,
Mr. Jallow has come to the Tribunal at the busiest period in its history, and will be under
more pressure to perform than any of his predecessors. As noted at various points in this
article, so much of the work the ICTR must accomplish before 2008 depends on
circumstances largely beyond Mr. Jallow’s control. His legacy will depend on the smooth
and integrated functioning of disparate elements of the Tribunal, many of which have
only recently achieved full speed, such as court scheduling, the availability of witnesses,
and language services. It must also be noted that heightened output in Arusha will put a
corresponding strain on the appeals chamber in the Hague, and the Security Council must
be willing to provide for those needs as well if the ICTR’s cases are to continue moving
along swiftly.
¶84
At this writing, the issue of prosecuting RPA war crimes remains unresolved. An
article by International Crisis Group suggests that during a May, 2003 meeting in
Washington, Carla del Ponte agreed in principle to step aside and allow Rwanda to
handle such prosecutions domestically, intervening only if Rwanda failed to do so
satisfactorily.233 However, no further evidence of this agreement has been found, and at
any rate del Ponte’s dismissal would likely make such an informal agreement void. A
diplomatic source at the UK mission to the UN was adamant that Mr. Jallow, as well as
the Security Council, was fully aware that the investigation of the RPF has not been
removed from the ICTR’s agenda with the removal of its chief proponent.234 With Mr.
Jallow permanently present in Arusha, and, perhaps even more importantly, with crucial
subordinate positions filled shortly before his arrival, OTP may indeed be substantially
more capable of carrying out this important task expediently.
¶85
Whatever the outcome of this long and arduous task, one must hope that the
legacy of the ICTR will be a sense of justice, however slight-- that at least some of the
perpetrators of such unfathomable cruelty will be meted out at least some of the
retribution they deserve. Yet regardless of the ICTR’s inefficiency or lack there of, and
regardless of the personality of its Prosecutor, adjudications in Arusha can offer little
consolation to Rwanda’s victims, both living and dead. This article has addressed some
of the myriad difficulties of dealing with a genocide after it is over. The author hopes that
the true lesson of the ICTR, however, will be to stop the next one before it begins.
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